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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Victoria Morin was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter DUI), a
violation of Idaho Code§ 18-800. A Request for Discovery was filed by the defense and in the
State's Second Addendum to Discovery it disclosed Dr. Gary Dawson as an expert witness. The
defense filed a Motion to Compel Discovery for a written summary or report of the expert
testimony it expected to present and the facts and data underlying the expert's opinion upon
which the expert would rely during his testimony. A Motion in Limine was also filed to exclude
any reference to Carboxy-THC. A hearing was held at which time the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to compel and provisionally denied the Motion in Limine.
The case proceeded to a Jury Trial; at which time Ms. Morin was convicted by a jury of
DUI. Ms. Morin timely filed her Notice of Appeal, the District Court heard argument and took
the matter under advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
affirming the conviction upon which Ms. Morin now timely appeals. On appeal, Ms. Morin
asserts that the trial court erred when it:

1) denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel thereby

denying her of her Constitutional right to due process and a fair trial guaranteed to her by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution when it allowed testimony over objection regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's expert
opinions which were never disclosed to the defense prior to trial; 2) denied Ms. Morin's Motion
in Limine to exclude testimony and evidence regarding Carboxy-THC a simple metabolite of
THC.
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Statement of the Facts
Victoria Morin's vehicle was stopped fully on the side of the road, out of a lane of travel
when Trooper Jayne initiated his contact on February 24, 2012 at approximately 5:57 p.m.
(6/23/13 Tr. p.217, Ls.23-25 - p.218, Ls.1-8). Ms. Morin's hazard lights were blinking, and
Trooper Jayne observed no traffic or law violations. (6/23/13 Tr. p.217, Ls.23-25 -p.218, Ls.18). Ms. Morin approached Trooper Jayne and advised him that her vehicle was out of gas, that
incident response was on their way, and that she had called her sister. (6/23/13 Tr. p.218, Ls.2023). Trooper Jayne then began a DUI investigation. (6/23/13 Tr. p.219, Ls.1-4).
During the initial encounter at the driver's side door, Trooper Jayne did not observe the
odor of marijuana, nor did he observe glassy or bloodshot eyes. (6/23/13 Tr. p.221, Ls.1-11).
Based on Trooper Jayne's observations, and the information provided by dispatch, he asked
Ms. Morin to perform Field Sobriety Tests.
Ls.19-21).

(6/23/13 Tr. p.156, Ls.5-25)(6/23/13 Tr. p.159,

Ms. Morin did not pass any of the tests and was placed under arrest for DUL

(6/23/13 Tr. p.158, Ls.8-20).

After Ms. Morin was placed in Trooper Jayne's vehicle for

transport to jail, Trooper Jayne still did not observe the odor of marijuana. (6/23/13 Tr. p.221,
Ls.11-15).
After Ms. Morin was transported to jail, Trooper Jayne conducted a Drug Recognition
Evaluation (hereinafter DRE). (6/23/13 Tr. p.186, Ls.1-6). As a result of the DRE, Trooper
Jayne concluded that Ms. Morin was under the influence of Cannabis and unable to operate a
motor vehicle safely.

(6/23/13 Tr. p.206, Ls.15-18).

Mr. Morin admitted to having used

marijuana about a week earlier (6/23/13 Tr. p.207, Ls.1-2), and provided a blood sample.
(6/23/13 Tr. p.209, Ls.1-3). Throughout the encounter, Ms. Morin was polite, cooperative, and
did not argue about anything. (6/23/13 Tr. p.212, Ls.9-15).
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ISSUES

I.

Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel thereby denying
her of her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution when the trial court allowed testimony over her objection
regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's expert opinions, which were never disclosed to the
defense prior to trial?

II.

Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Morin's Motion in Limine, which sought to
exclude testimony regarding Carboxy-THC, a simple metabolite of THC?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Err When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion To Compel Thereby Denying Her Of
Her Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair Trial Guaranteed Under The Fourteenth
Amendment To The United States Constitution And Article 1, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution
When The Trial Court Allowed Testimony Over Her Objection Regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's
Expert Opinions, Which Were Never Disclosed To The Defense Prior To Trial.
A.

Introduction
When the Court denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel production of the information

sought, it approved of the State's continuing violation ofldaho Criminal Rule 16. Furthermore,
such error was not harmless, and the State should have been compelled pursuant to the rules of
discovery to provide Ms. Morin with the underlying facts and data which would tend to
substantiate Dr. Dawson's expert opinions.
Ms. Morin was further denied her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial when
over objection the trial court allowed Dr. Dawson to testify to expert opinions without any prior
disclosure of those opinions and the underlying facts and data for those opinions. Therefore, Ms.
Morin was unable to adequately challenge the evidence presented against her or adequately
cross-examine Dr. Dawson
B.

Standard of Review

The trial court's refusal to compel the State to disclose the expert opinion of Gary Dawson and
the underlying facts and data for that opinion as well as the Court's decision to admit evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729,731,240 P.3d 575,577
(2010). Generally speaking, the lower court has sole discretion in deciding whether to admit or
exclude evidence. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001). But, this
discretion is not unlimited. The trial court must exercise reason in its decision making. Id.
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Nonetheless, this "broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial will be reversed only
where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion." Id. at 732, 24 P.3d at 49.
In reviewing a discretionary decision of a trial court, this Court reviews the record to
determine if the lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
bounds of discretion and consistently with any legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise ofreason. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,669,227 P.3d 918,923 (2010).
1. The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion To Compel The

Opinions, And The Facts and Data Underlying The Opinions, Of The State's
Expert Gary Dawson.
The trial court erred when it denied Ms. Morin's motion to compel Dr. Dawson's expert
opinion. The State is required by Idaho Criminal Rule 16 to disclose a written summary or
report of the expert testimony it expects to present and the facts and data underlying the expert's
opinion upon which the expert will rely during his testimony.
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 (b )(7) provides:
Upon written request of the defendant the prosecutor shall provide a
written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce
pursuant to Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or
hearing. The summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, and the
witness's qualifications.
I.C.R. 16(b)(7) (emphases added). This is not an optional rule, or suggested practice, that the
state can choose to follow or ignore. It is specifically laid out in the rules regarding discovery,
and the defendant need only make a written request, which burden was satisfied when, in the
original request for discovery, Ms. Morin requested:
(8) [A] written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to
introduce pursuant to rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at
trial or hearing; including the witnesses' opinions, the facts and data for those
opinions, and the witnesses' qualifications.
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(R., p.15). Rule 705 permits an expert to testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the

reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data provided that the court
may require otherwise, and provided further that, if requested pursuant to the rules of discovery,
the underlying facts and data were disclosed. I.R.E. 705.
A witness is qualified as an expert by his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training,
education, or other specialized knowledge. Id. The test for determining whether a witness is
qualified as an expert is "not rigid" and can be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. West v.
Sanke, 132 Idaho 133, 138-39, 968 P.2d 228, 233-34 (1998). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
I.R.E. 702.
This Court has observed,
An "expert" in a court proceeding is someone possessing skill or
knowledge beyond the competency of the average juror. Formal training or an
advanced degree is not essential to qualify a witness as an expert, but practical
experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a witness within the
category of "expert."

IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 136, 142, 697 P.2d 1150, 1157 (1985) (emphasis

added), overruled on other grounds by Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs, l 08
Idaho 757, 762, 702 P.2d 795, 800 (1985).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 indicates that expert witnesses may testify "in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." I.RE. 702 (emphasis added). The term otherwise, as used in I.R.E. 702,
indicates that the determination of whether a witness is an expert does not depend solely on
whether he or she testifies to an opinion. Indeed, simply providing specialized knowledge to the
trier of fact is enough to render a witness an expert under Rule 702.
6

In this case the only disclosure made by the state with regard to Dr. Dawson's testimony

is as follows:
Dr. Dawson is an expert in toxicology and pharmacology and will assist the trier
of fact in understanding the evidence regarding the effects of drugs on the
behavior and performance of the defendant as reported in this case. Dr. Dawson
will utilize known and generally accepted scientific principles of absorption,
distribution, metabolization and excretion of drugs. Testimony may include
information on the effects of the drugs consumed by the defendant in this case and
the possible effects of said drugs.
(R., p.43) . (4/08/13 Motion Hr., p.15, Ls. 1-12). Because the trial court denied Ms. Morin's

Motion to Compel, and the State was not required to provide a written report of Dr. Dawson
including his opinions and the underlying facts and data upon which he relied, which would tend
to substantiate his findings, Ms. Morin was unable to adequately defend herself against the
state's accusations. Passages of Dr. Dawson's testimony are included below in Section 2 and are
hereby incorporated by reference. This testimony was far greater than what the state's disclosure
revealed.
Ms. Morin was unable to challenge the evidence presented against her at trial and unable
to adequately cross-examine Dr. Dawson or challenge any provided testimony.

The State's

minimal, non-specific disclosure was a discovery violation, and the trial courts denial of Ms.
Morin's Motion to Compel was an abuse of discretion that does not pass the harmless error test.
2. Ms. Morin Was Denied Her Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair Trial
Guaranteed Under The Fourteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution
And Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution When The Trial Court, Over Her
Objection, Allowed Testimony Regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's Expert Opinions
Which Were Never Disclosed To Her Prior To Trial
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to

be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and
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capricious acts of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due process
requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv.
of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).

"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due

process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)). Due process also demands
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 182 (1996). Thus, due process is violated if a defendant is not
afforded "a reasonable opportunity to meet [the charges] by way of defense or explanation." In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,275 (1948);see also State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684,690,217 P. 611,
614 (1923) ("It is the public policy of this state, disclosed by constitutional guaranties as well as
by numerous provisions of the statutes, to accord to every person accused of crime ... every
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and to vindicate his innocence upon a trial.") and
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,239,220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009).
When Dr. Dawson was called to testify, foundation was laid for his experience and
training. (6/23/13 Tr. p.402-409). When the State began to ask questions regarding Ms. Morin's
case, defense counsel objected and what follows is the colloquy between defense counsel and the
Court:
Q. Doctor, have you had opportunity to review the reports prepared by Corporal Jayne?

[Defense] Judge, I'm just A

Yes.

[Defense] - going to, for the record, my standing objection to this doctor being able to
testify with regards - with regards to pre-trial issues. And I'd like my standing objection
to be heard based on the discovery rule violation, as well as due process for Victoria.
I understand it's overruled, you - we said that, but I would like my standing objection
just to be on the record with regard to any testimony that he's providing.
8

The Court: All right. That's noted for the record.
(6/24/13 Tr., p.409, Ls.23 - p.410, L.14.)
Dr. Dawson testified as an expert at trial. (6/23/13 Tr. p.409, Ls.18-22).The following is
testimony which was offered by Dr. Dawson with regard to his opinion as to whether Ms. Morin
was impaired and unable to operate a motor vehicle safely:
Q. Can you explain for the jury what carboxy THC is?

A

Carboxy THC is the inactive metabolite of tetrahydrocannibinol, which is one of the
primary components in the marijuana leaf.

A

The other piece that it tells us is if we see it in the blood, that there's one of two
possibilities. In chronic smokers, it can be persistent there. Smokers of marijuana, it
could be there for some period of time. In infrequent smokers, it's more likely that
the exposure was acute.

Q. Explain that; what do you mean the exposure being more acute?

(6/24/13 Tr., p.410, Ls.25 -p.411, L.24).
Q. And you stated that Carboxy THC is an inactive metabolite?

A Yes.
Q. Does it have any effect on the body, on a person's ability to perform functions?

A No.

Q. But you stated that there are other indications that you look for to determine a
window. What other indications would you be looking for?
A There are a number of physical symptoms one would begin to look for in terms of
indication of impairment. ... there might be other contributing factors as well. ...
So, we would begin to look for physical signs and symptoms. . ..
There's often problems with - with other aspects of cognitive function, which may
have to do with the - the ability to think clearly, the ability to make decisions, shortterm memory loss, the ability to have a -- a - a conversation that is reflective of the
current context within which the - the individual is being interviewed. It's not
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unusual to see disconnective speech or though patterns that don't follow during that
acute exposure.
There's also the psychomotor function ....
. . . -- a coating on the tongue, a green coating on the tongue, which would indicate
reasonable recent exposure.
(6/24/13 Tr., p.413, Ls.2 - p.415, L.18).
Q. Thank you. Additionally amphetamine was found in the defendant's blood.
A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe for the jury what amphetamine is?
A.

Amphetamine is a central nervous system stimulant.

Q.

Would they cancel each other out.

A.

Not necessarily because - there's - theres's a couple ofreasons, and we start getting
- at - at the risk of getting too far out in the weeds here, I want - the - the
amphetamine works at the one set of receptors. And the tetrahydrocannibinol works
at the different set of receptors.

Tachyphylaxis means you keep stimulating something long enough, it - its response
to that stimulation goes away -- not -- it doesn't go away, but it becomes less
noticeable. And in - in effect, its sort of - it's - it's sort of like a battery that if you
keep flashing the light on and off, on and off, on and off, pretty soon it gets dimmer,
and dimmer. And dimmer, and dimmer, and pretty soon it might stay on, but it's
very, very dim compared to what it was at first.
And so, that's - that's the effect that amphetamine has on nerve terminals. It causes
the -- the neurotransmitters to be depleted over a period of time.
(6/24/13 Tr., p.424, Ls.8 - p.430, L.7).

Q. Additionally, venlafaxine and nor-venlafaxine were reported in the blood. Can you
describe those drugs?

A.

and so, that, in effect with taking Effexor as an anti-depressant, you're getting two
for the price of one. So, as Effexor, the venlafaxine is metabolized to nor-
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venlafaxine in the body, not only is the Effex - the venlafaxine exerting an effect, its
metabolite is active and its exerting an effect.

Q. And the Effexor -- because it is an easier word to say -- is that a central nervous
system depressant, or stimulant, or something different?
A.

In -- in -- in the sense of the -- the DRE exam, it falls within the category of CNS
depressants.
And so, the -- the issue with the central nervous system depressant, the gaze that we
look at is one of the things we specifically identify as being associated with a central
nervous system depressant, whether its alcohol, or narcotics, or sleeping pills, or
whatever. It has to do with the motor control, the muscles that move the eye.

Q. And you say there's been no reporting of Nystagmus with Effexor?
A. I -- I am not aware of any, no.

A. When you begin to add -- when you add medications together that exert similar
effects in -- in the brain, in terms of -- of depressant effects, you get something -- a
phenomenon we know as -- as an additive effect.

(6/24/13 Tr., p.421, Ls. I - p.423, L.2
Ms. Morin contends that the trial court erred when it allowed testimony from Dr. Gary
Dawson regarding his opinions when those opinions were not disclosed to the defense prior to
trial and of even more importance Dr. Dawson could not provide the facts and data upon which
his expert testimony was based. At trial, Dr. Gary Dawson, offered the following testimony
regarding the facts and data underlying his opinion:
Q.

You didn't provide a written summary or report with regard to the testimony that
you're providing today?

[State] Objection, Your Honor; relevance. May we have a side bar.
The Court: Step up, Counsel.
(Bench Conference)
The Court: I'll overrule the objection.
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[Defense Counsel] You didn't re - prepare or provide a written report to this - in this
case?
A. No.

Q. And so, no information with regards to any studies, or scientifically peer reviewed
studies. Or anything like that were provided to the defense with regard to what your
opinions rely on?
A. No.

Q. And you haven't provided or made reference to any scientific basis for your opinions
today?
A. No.

(6/24/12 Tr., p.437, Ls.18 -p.438, L.13).
The District Court held that the "state should have been required to provide a more
complete disclosure to Ms. Morin concerning Dr. Dawson's testimony. However, the court also
finds that while Judge Gardunia did err in denying the Motion to Compel, Ms. Morin has not
demonstrated that her substantial rights were violated." (R., p.208) The District Court applied
the incorrect standard as Ms. Morin is not required to demonstrate that her substantial rights were
violated. Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, the
appellate court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test. State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho 584, 598, 301 p.3d 242, 256 (2013). If the appellate court finds that the district court
erred, then the appellate court must declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not affect the outcome of the trial, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible.

Id.

Therefore because the district court erred in its analysis and in fact found an abuse of

discretion, a reversal is necessitated, unless that State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id.

12

Dr. Dawson's testimony regarding all of the above was more than just known and
generally accepted scientific principles of absorption, distribution, metabolization, and excretion
of drugs. This testimony was unsupported by any scientific studies or peer reviewed studies, or
journal articles and, even after questioning by the defense, Dr. Dawson could not name or
provide the relevant data and science behind his opinions. One of the most alarming issues is
Dr. Dawson's testimony specifically about a drug called Effexor and how that one specific
central nervous system depressant is not known to cause HGN. (6/23/13 Tr. p.429, Ls.12-14).
Yet he could provide no scientific data to back that claim up and Trooper Jayne who is a certified
Drug Recognition Evaluator testified that all CNS depressants cause HGN and that it is very
similar to alcohol. (6/23/13 Tr. p.310, Ls.3-25-p.312, Ls. 1-25).
Dr Dawson's entire testimony was an attempt by the State to prove guilt by whatever
means necessary.

In essence the expert was allowed to get on the stand and testify as to

anything he wants, or anything which would tend to make the State's case stronger, without
writing a report and providing the underlying facts and data which would support those opinions,
making it impossible for the defense to properly cross examine him - or obtain an expert of her
own to contradict his unknown testimony - because Ms. Morin had no idea what his testimony
was going to be. The State was permitted to present undisclosed evidence against Ms. Morin, in
blatant violation of Ms. Morin's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. This is the
type of trial-by-ambush that was supposed to be eliminated by the adoption of the rules of
discovery.
While the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, it failed to act within
the legal standards applicable and the trial court did not come to the conclusion by an exercise of
reason. As part of this exercise, the trial court is required to weigh the prejudice that may affect
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the party suffering from the non-disclosure, and in this case, the trial court did not weigh the
prejudice against Ms. Morin, thereby further abusing its discretion.
Because the trial court denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel and the State was not
required to provide a written report of Dr. Dawson including the underlying facts and data upon
which he relied and because the defense objected to all testimony from Dr. Dawson, Ms. Morin
was unable to adequately defend herself against the State's case. Ms. Morin was unable to
challenge the evidence presented against her at trial and unable to adequately cross-examine
Dr. Dawson or even meaningfully challenge any provided testimony because the defense did not
have an opportunity to present a report to its own expert or conduct adequate preparation for
meaningful cross-examination. Because the trial court abused its discretion, depriving her of her
constitutional right to due process and a fair trial, and the District Court erred in its analysis
regarding a substantial prejudice, the State is unable to establish that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, and Ms. Morin's conviction should be vacated, with the matter
remanded for a new trial.

IL
The Trial Court Err When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion In Limine, Which Sought To Exclude
All Testimony Regarding Carboxy-THC, A Simple Metabolite Of THC

A.

Introduction
Because Carboxy-THC is, by law, not an intoxicant, all testimony and evidence of

intoxication due to Carboxy-THC, namely the lab test result confirming the presence of
Carboxy-THC in Ms. Morin's blood and opinion evidence from Trooper Jayne and Dr. Dawson
that Ms. Morin was under the influence or impaired due to the presence of Carboxy-THC, should
have been excluded.
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B.

Standard of Review
A trial court has discretion in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, and its

decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521 (2003);

State v. Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 683, 290 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Ct.App.2012). In reviewing a
discretionary decision of a trial court, this Court reviews the record to determine if the lower
court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the bounds of discretion and
consistently with any legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669.
C.

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion In Limine, Which Sought To
Exclude All Testimony Regarding Carboxy-THC, A Simple Metabolite Of THC
Mr. Morin was charged with violating Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 ), which makes it

unlawful to "drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle" while "under the influence
of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance .... "

LC. § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis

added). According to the evidence, one of the substances found in Ms. Morin's blood was
Carboxy-THC. As a matter of law, Carboxy-THC is not an intoxicating substance. See Idaho

Transp. Dep 't v. Reisnauer, 145 Idaho 948 (2008). Thus, the presence of Carboxy-THC in
Ms. Morin's blood is not relevant to the charge of driving ''under the influence of alcohol, drugs
or any other intoxicating substances," and evidence of the presence of Carboxy-THC in
Ms. Morin's blood should have been excluded. See I.R.E. 401 (defining relevant evidence);
I.R.E. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). Similarly, any opinion evidence
from a police officer, lab personnel, or other witness that Ms. Morin was unable to operate a
vehicle safely because she was under the influence of cannabis should have been excluded
because there is no recognized scientific basis to support such an opinion and such opinion
evidence accordingly would be without foundation and not relevant to any facts at issue in the
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case. See I.R.E. 401, 402, 403, 702. Finally, because Carboxy-THC is not intoxicating, there
can be no inference that any impairment observed by the officer was caused by Carboxy-THC,
and accordingly, any testimony or other evidence regarding any observations of impairment must
be excluded.
In Reisenauer, the Court addressed the presence of Carboxy-THC in the context of an
administrative license suspension. The Court held that Carboxy-THC "is not in and of itself a
drug" and that "it is only a metabolite of a drug." Reisenauer, 145 Idaho at 950-51. Thus, the
presence of Carboxy-THC "in a urine sample is no evidence of the presence of any drug" and
"there clearly was not substantial competent evidence [the defendant] failed an evidentiary test
for drugs." Id. at 951. As the Court explained, "the drug that must be present also must be

intoxicating." Id. (emphasis in original). Because the Department of Transportation had "not
alleged or proved that Carboxy-THC is intoxicating, and since the test results revealed only the
presence of Carboxy-THC, [the defendant] met his burden of proving that the results did not
show the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances." Id.
The holding in Reisenauer is that the presence of a substance in a defendant's blood is
relevant under Idaho's DUI statutes only if that substance is intoxicating, and (2) holds that an
officer's observations of a defendant's impairment support an inference that the impairment is
caused by a substance found in the defendant's blood only when there is separate proof that the
substance is intoxicating.
In the most recent case to consider the issue of Carboxy-THC -the Court of Appeals
held, "Because the toxicology report indicated the presence of Carboxy-THC, but not THC, it
was, in essence, a negative drug test. The State did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate
marijuana intoxication at the time Stark was driving. State v. Stark, 2013 WL 1338841 (Ct.App.

16

2013). It further held, "Although the State proved that Stark was impaired, and that he had used
marijuana at some point in the past, the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to prove
that Stark's impairment was caused by Stark's past marijuana use." Id. Finally, the Court held,
"While it may be possible, through the use of expert testimony, to demonstrate that a person is
under the influence of an unknown drug or intoxicating substance that does not appear on a
toxicology report, the State did not present such testimony in this case. We again emphasize that
the toxicology report did not reveal the presence of an intoxicating drug or substance, which,
together with evidence of Stark's impairment, would almost certainly have been sufficient to
prove a violation of section 18-8004 under the totality of the evidence method of proof" Id.
In the present case, one of the substances found in Ms. Morin's blood, Carboxy-THC, is
not intoxicating. Thus, the presence of Carboxy-THC is not relevant and such evidence should
have been excluded.

Further, because Carboxy-THC is not intoxicating, there can be no

inference that any observations of impairment was caused by the Carboxy-THC.
Courts from other states have also held that Carboxy-THC is not an intoxicant and that
the presence of Carboxy-THC does not demonstrate that an individual is under the influence of
an intoxicant.

In People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 2010), the Supreme Court of

Michigan vacated a defendant's conviction under Michigan's DUI laws, holding that CarboxyTHC is not an intoxicant, "has no known pharmacological effect," and that a "person cannot be
prosecuted" under the DUI laws "for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of' CarboxyTHC "in his or her system." Id. at 83. In so holding, the court noted "no federal court has held
that [Carboxy-THC] is a controlled substance." Id. at 81. In Spires v. Raymond Westbrook
Logging, 997 So.2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 2008), the Court of Appeals of Louisiana held, in the
context of a worker's compensation benefits determination, that "intoxication" was not
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established where the toxicology report showed the presence of Carboxy-THC, "the
nonpsychoactive metabolite of THC," because

"Carboxy THC is not an indicator of

intoxication." Id. at 176, 179.
Because Carboxy-THC is not, as a matter of law, an intoxicant, the presence of CarboxyTHC in Ms. Morin's blood was not relevant to the charge against her of driving ''under the
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances." LC. 18-8004(1 ). Evidence of
the presence of Carboxy-THC in Ms. Morin's blood should have been excluded. Similarly, any
opinion evidence from a police officer, lab personnel, or other witness that Ms. Morin was
driving under the influence of an intoxicant based on the presence of Carboxy-THC in her blood
must be excluded because there is no recognized scientific basis to support such an opinion and
such opinion evidence accordingly would be without foundation and not relevant to any facts at
issue in the case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Morin respectfully requests that this court vacate her
judgment of conviction and dismiss the case with prejudice as a sanction for the State's blatant
disregard for the rules of discovery as well as the constitutional rights of Ms. Morin. In the
alternative, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand her case for a new
trial.

DATED this 18th day of August 2014.

HEIDI J -~SON
Attorney for Defendant
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